Licensed shared access (LSA) has been adopted as a new paradigm by several different regulatory and industrial stakeholders. The European LSA two-tier approach opens the possibility to lease the spectrum more dynamically among network operators implementing different wireless technologies. The initial use cases considered mobile network operators (MNOs) leasing spectrum from other technologies. However, recent initiatives emphasized an important symmetric use case, where programme making and special events (PMSE) users could lease spectrum from MNOs short-term for concerts, conferences, etc. In this market, the MNOs should first have economic incentives to temporarily lease the spectrum that they do not fully use to PMSE users.
Introduction
Licensed shared access (LSA) [1] has been adopted in Europe as a new paradigm to share licensed spectrum between different networks and technologies, in order to improve spectrum utilization, while guaranteeing the offered services. LSA proposes a two-tier approach to lease spectrum more dynamically than via traditional spectrum auctions, where the initial target use case considered mobile network operators (MNOs) leasing spectrum in the 2.3-2.4 GHz band from incumbent technologies like Programme Making and Special Events (PMSE) [2] . However, recent initiatives from industry and spectrum regulators have focused on the symmetric use case, where PMSE users could lease spectrum from MNOs. This is a promising approach for cases such as the decision of the UK regulator Ofcom to clear the spectrum originally reserved for exclusive use by PMSE [3] . Furthermore, leasing spectrum from MNOs is also suitable for reliable short-term use of spectrum by PMSE for concerts, conferences, etc. [4] .
Though the potential for technical benefits from the adoption of licensed spectrum sharing has been generally acknowledged, it also introduces economic and business concerns to the key stakeholders (regulator, incumbent spectrum user, and LSA licensee) [5] . These include the costs of additional infrastructure, probable required modifications of the existing systems to support and manage the sharing procedure, and license fees [5] . Thus, apart from the necessary technical analysis, the stakeholders must perform a techno-economic analysis in order to assess whether licensed spectrum sharing is worth the investment. However, business research focusing on licensed spectrum sharing is scarce [6] [7] [8] and focuses on the qualitative domain, without offering quantitative results on whether LSA-like schemes are techno-economically attractive.
The goal of this work is to cover this gap in the literature and present an extensive technoeconomic study for spectrum sharing under the LSA framework. We analyse a monopolistic market with a single MNO leasing spectrum to a number of PMSE users that belong to two distinct quality-of-service (QoS) classes, admitting either low or high QoS requirements. The key technical challenge is to estimate the maximum number of supported PMSE users under different configurations of technical parameters, including carrier frequency, bandwidth, base station (BS) transmit power and propagation environment. Taking this as an input, we study scenarios where all users have either high or low QoS requirements, as well as mixed QoS requirements. From a techno-economic perspective, our contributions are the following:
• We develop QoS-aware pricing models [9] , where PMSE users pay different prices depending on their chosen traffic class; users belonging to the high QoS class are charged more than those belonging to the low QoS class. Then, we extend these pricing models to include the case where subgroups of users of the same QoS class are charged differently. We compare these models that correspond to applications of second and third degree of price discrimination [9] with the baseline policy of no price discrimination, where all PMSE users pay the same price.
• Our quantitative results based on current prices such as the ones adopted by Ofcom reveal that, whenever either all PMSE users or all PMSE users with low QoS requirements can afford to pay the face value (i.e. the initial price), the MNO's revenue is maximized for the no price discrimination policy for almost all configurations of the technical parameters. This is due to the fact that the market equilibrium, where the MNO's revenue is the same for the different pricing policies, is admitted for a significantly higher price for the users with high QoS. Therefore, we expect that the market will operate at a region lower than the market equilibrium, where it is more beneficial for the MNO to support the users with low QoS requirements. On the other hand, whenever the purchasing power of the PMSE users of the low QoS class varies and the MNO needs to apply discounts to a subset of them, the trends change significantly. Price discrimination can be the dominant pricing policy in this case and the MNO prefers to support either users with high QoS requirements or mixed QoS scenarios.
System Model
In this section we first present our considered techno-economic problem in Section 2.1, where we introduce the scenarios and the pricing policies. In Section 2.2 we then explain the simulation methodology and parameters.
The Techno-Economic Problem
In this section, we introduce the techno-economic problem that we are going to analyse. We assume a monopolistic market with one MNO and N PMSE users that are interested in leasing spectrum from the unique MNO. Consistent with one of the business models in [4] , we assume that the PMSE users also use the network infrastructure of the MNOs. Specifically, the PMSE users connect to the LTE BSs, so that they do not need to install their own BSs. Furthermore, we consider that the PMSE users are classified into two distinct QoS classes: There are N L PMSE users with low QoS requirements (e.g., audio speech applications) and N H PMSE users with high QoS requirements (e.g., high definition audio productions). We are interested in analyzing from a techno-economic point of view the following three scenarios:
The MNO supports N L users, where all of them have the same low QoS requirements Q L .
• Scenario 2: The MNO supports N H users, where all of them have the same high QoS requirements Q H .
• Scenario 3: The MNO supports users with mixed QoS requirements, i.e. N L,M users with Q L and N H ,M users with Q H .
For a given set of technical parameters including carrier frequency f , propagation environment, BS transmit power level T , bandwidth B, and QoS requirements Q L and Q H , the first challenge is to estimate the maximum number of supported PMSE users for the three considered scenarios. The methodology will be described in detail in Section 2.2.
Given this input, the goal of the MNO is to define a pricing policy and choose among these three scenarios the one that will maximize its revenue. In the following paragraphs, we propose four pricing policies and we compare the MNO's revenue for each scenario and policy.
The first pricing policy that we consider is called no price discrimination [9] . According to this policy, there is no price differentiation among the PMSE users; consequently, the MNO sets the same price P for each PMSE user independent of its QoS requirements. No price discrimination is used widely in the telecommunication markets due to its simplicity [10] and has already been adopted in PMSE business models [11] . For the three considered scenarios, we note that, based on the QoS requirements of the PMSE users, the following inequalities hold for the number of users that can be supported:
Therefore, (1) suggests that the MNO has always motivation to adopt Scenario 1 and support the N L users with Q L , since this scenario yields the highest revenue (i.e. the sum of the amounts that each user will pay).
Besides this baseline pricing policy, we are interested in exploring whether the different degrees of price discrimination, i.e. charging different prices for different groups of PMSE users, can raise the MNO's revenue. We propose that the differentiation is based on the QoS class that each user belongs to, focusing on QoS-aware pricing schemes [9] . How to properly price a network with differentiated services has attracted a lot of attention in both wired [12] and wireless networks [13] . Depending on the assumptions and the model, price discrimination may maximize e.g. the revenue of the operator or the social welfare.
There are three degrees of price discrimination [9] . The first degree of price discrimination corresponds to the case where there are personalized prices for each PMSE user. Though this form of price discrimination may achieve the theoretical maximum revenue for the MNO for the case that each PMSE user pays the maximum possible amount that it can afford, it is not a practical pricing model. Firstly, it is unrealistic for the MNO to know the private valuation of each PMSE user for the different QoS requirements. Secondly, providing personalized offers is a very resource-hungry policy, since it should be updated continuously as new users enter into the market. Due to these disadvantages, this policy is not used in practice in current techno-economic models [9] and we do not consider it further.
The second pricing policy that we adopt corresponds to the second degree of price discrimination. In this form of discrimination, there are at least two distinct prices, which correspond to at least two different types of services. Any customer who wants the same type of service will pay the same price. In our case, we propose that the discrimination will be based on the QoS class that each PMSE user belongs to; each user that targets for Q L pays P L , whereas each user that targets for Q H pays P H . We also define parameter K = P H P L which is always above 1.
Then, the revenue of the MNO for each of the three scenarios will be one of the following:
The scenario that maximizes the MNO's revenue can be computed by the following formula:
It is worth mentioning that if we assume that P L = P , the revenue from the PMSE users with low QoS is the same for both pricing policies (i.e. no price discrimination and second degree of price discrimination). The assumption that the price for one class of customers is equal to the price of the baseline policy can be used to facilitate the comparison between the no price discrimination policy and the second degree of price discrimination. Whenever Scenario 1 with the users with low QoS generates the highest revenue, the economic interpretation is that the no price discrimination policy outperforms the second degree of price discrimination. On the other hand, whenever Scenarios 2 or 3 generate higher revenue than the no price discrimination, then the price discrimination is beneficial for the MNO.
From a mathematical point of view, we note that the decision of the MNO in (2) depends only on the ratio of the prices, not on their exact values. However, in practice, the PMSE users' demand for any QoS class is not perfectly inelastic [10] , meaning that the corresponding prices should not be higher than a limit. Therefore, it is critical to identify the price range of each QoS class where we expect that the users are indeed willing to buy the service. This will be studied extensively during the quantitative performance evaluation in Section 3.
The third pricing policy that we propose corresponds to a third degree of price discrimination, where groups of users (e.g., students, seniors, repeat customers) that ask for the same product are charged differently. This form of discrimination arises if we assume that there are two distinct subgroups of users with Q H :
• N H ,M users that will be served in both Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 who can afford to pay
• N H − N H ,M users that will be served only in Scenario 2 who cannot afford P H and they should pay a discounted price s H P H with s H being between 0 and 1.
In the third pricing policy, the revenue for the users with low QoS in Scenario 1 and mixed QoS in Scenario 3 is the same as for the second pricing policy. The updated revenue for the users with high QoS in Scenario 2 is equal to:
Scenario 2-High QoS with discount: 
Then, the maximum revenue among the three scenarios can be computed by using the formula:
where, the first term corresponds to no price discrimination, the second term to the third degree of price discrimination and the third term to the second degree of price discrimination.
Finally, we can naturally extend the third pricing policy by proposing the adoption of a third degree of price discrimination not only for the PMSE users with Q H but also for the users with Q L . We assume that N L,M users can pay P L and the rest N L − N L,M will pay a discounted price s L P L with s L being between 0 and 1. The updated revenue for the PMSE users with Q L is equal to:
In this fourth pricing policy, the revenue for the PMSE users with high QoS and mixed QoS requirements is the same as for the third pricing policy. Then, the maximum revenue among the three scenarios can be computed by using the formula:
The first two terms correspond to the third degree of price discrimination, whereas the third term corresponds to the second degree of price discrimination.
We conclude the section by presenting 
Simulation Model
In this section we present the simulation model that we consider for estimating the maximum number of supported PMSE users for the three scenarios that we discussed in Section 2.1. We assume that each PMSE user has either high or low QoS requirements, as summarized in Table 2 .
We define the QoS requirements in terms of the target Application-layer throughput R, where high QoS and low QoS correspond to 4.61 Mbps and 150 kbps, respectively. 1 We note that these values are consistent with the highest and lowest PMSE audio throughput requirements in [4, 14] , where low throughput values correspond to audio speech applications, while high throughput values are required for high definition audio productions [15] .
We consider downlink traffic (i.e. from the BSs to the PMSE users) and we estimate the maximum number of PMSE users that can be supported (i.e. their QoS requirements are fulfilled) by each LTE BS for the three scenarios of Section 2.1. For Scenario 3, we set N H,M = 0.5N H and the rest are users with low QoS.
In order to estimate the maximum number of supported PMSE users per BS for the three considered scenarios, we assume that the PMSE users are randomly located within a distance d max user =150 m from the BS that they are associated with [4] and that they suffer from interference from other BSs, as shown in Fig. 1 . The interference is caused by the six closest BSs, where all BSs transmit simultaneously using the same spectrum. We thus consider the worst case where the PMSE users suffer from the aggregate interference I agg from all six BSs. Importantly, due to the symmetry of the BS locations (cf. Fig. 1 ), the number of supported PMSE users for BS 1 28 £ for 48-hour access to bandwidth B=5 MHz [11] price P H for each user with high QoS requirements The number of PMSE users for which the throughput QoS requirements are fulfilled depends on the bandwidth B that is available per BS to be shared among the users. Furthermore, the throughput of each user also depends not only on the quality of the link between the BS and the user, but also on the level of interference from other BSs. These factors determine, in turn, the modulation and coding scheme that should be applied for the link and thus the data rate, i.e.
how fast data can be transmitted. Some major technical parameters that affect both the link quality and the interference level are the carrier frequency f , the BS transmit power T , and the propagation environment. We take into account the configurations of technical parameter values summarized in Table 2 and for each configuration of B, f , T , and propagation environment we apply the following steps to estimate the number of supported PMSE users per BS.
Step 1: We assume a single PMSE user associated with BS 1 and located at the maximum distance d max user =150 m from BS 1 (cf. Fig. 1 ). For this user we determine the maximum tolerable aggregate interference I max agg from the six closest BSs, such that the high QoS requirements (i.e. R=4.61 Mbps) are fulfilled. We first apply a low aggregate interference I agg =−110 dBm and then we increase I agg in steps of 5 dB until the throughput of the user decreases below the target value R=4.61 Mbps. The highest value of I agg for which the target throughput is still achieved is selected as the maximum tolerable aggregate interference I max agg . Fig. 2 shows an example of how I max agg is selected for one configuration of technical parameters. In this example I max agg =−95 dBm, since for I agg >−95 dBm the throughput is lower than 4.61 Mbps. We perform these simulations in the ns-3 network simulator, 2 where we use the LTE module and we apply the parameter values in Table 2 and the corresponding path loss (PL) models in Table 3 , for the radio link between BS 1 and the PMSE user. For the interested reader, the resulting I max agg values for other configurations of parameters are summarized in Appendix A.
Step 2: Based on the maximum tolerable aggregate interference I max agg , we determine the minimum inter-BS distance d BS , such that the six interfering BSs (i.e. BS 2 -BS 7 ) do not cause an aggregate interference level higher than I max agg at the PMSE user located at d max user =150 m from BS 1 (cf. Fig. 1 ). We then randomly deploy other PMSE users within d max user =150 m from BS 1 , where the locations of the first ten users are shown in Fig. 3 . 3 For each user we estimate the received power from BS 1 and the level of aggregate interference from BS 2 -BS 7 by applying the PL models in Table 3 . This step is performed through simulations in MATLAB and the resulting values for d BS are summarized in Appendix B. We note that d BS is also indicative of the density of supported PMSE users in a larger area covered by multiple BSs. T =30 dBm, f =2600 MHz, and B=20 MHz, for the outdoor environment. 
outdoor COST 231 Step 3: Finally, we conduct simulations in ns-3 for BS 1 and its associated users. We estimate the maximum number of supported PMSE users for BS 1 by deploying the users successively.
We observe the resulting throughput of each user, and we increase the number of users until the throughput of one of them is below its QoS target. The highest number of users for which the QoS requirements of each of them are fulfilled is selected as the maximum number of supported users.
Results
In this section we present and discuss our quantitative techno-economic results as follows. In Section 3.1, we first present the number of supported PMSE users and the MNO's revenue for users with the same QoS after the application of the first two pricing policies. Section 3.2 then presents the number of supported PMSE users with mixed QoS and evaluates all pricing policies for the three considered scenarios.
Results for PMSE Users with the Same QoS Requirements
In this section we present and discuss the results for the scenarios where all users have the same QoS requirements, i.e. either low or high (cf. Scenarios 1 and 2 in Table 2 ). We first present the maximum number of supported users in Section 3.1.1 and then the techno-economic results in Section 3.1.2.
Number of Supported PMSE Users
Fig . 4 shows the maximum number of supported PMSE users per BS for the scenarios where all users have the same QoS requirements. As expected, the number of users with low QoS N L (up to 65) is significantly higher than the number of users with high QoS N H (up to 6), regardless of the frequency or propagation environment. This is due to the significant difference in the required throughput for the two QoS classes, where the same BS radio resources can be shared among many users with low throughput requirements, but only among few users with high throughput requirements.
In general, when the bandwidth B increases for a given propagation environment and QoS class, the number of supported users increases (e.g. low QoS, indoor environment in Fig. 4(a) ).
This is expected, since a larger bandwidth can typically accommodate more wireless transmissions and thus more users. However, there are cases where the number of users is constant when increasing the bandwidth from B=5 MHz to B=10 MHz (e.g. high or low QoS, outdoor environment in Fig. 4(a) ). This occurs due to the combined effect of the user location and the insufficient increase in bandwidth. Specifically, the received power and aggregate interference of each user depends on its location and in turn determine the data rate that should be used to carry traffic from the BS to this user. In some cases, increasing the bandwidth B by only 5 MHz cannot compensate for both adding a new user and a low data rate corresponding to a location at a large distance from the BS.
The trend with respect to the propagation environment is different for different carrier fre- Step 1 in Section 2.2). Consequently, there are better link conditions for T =30 dBm, such that the data traffic of a single user can be carried faster (i.e. with a higher data rate) and thus more users can be accommodated.
Finally, we note that low numbers of supported PMSE users correspond in practice to the number of PMSE devices used for news gathering and production of documentaries (i.e. up to 6), while moderate to high numbers of devices (i.e. 18-86) were used for music awards, TV
productions, and open-air concerts [21] .
MNO's Revenue for No Discrimination vs. Second Degree of Price Discrimination
In this section, we focus on Scenarios 1 and 2, where all users have either the same low QoS requirements or the same high QoS requirements. We compute the MNO's revenue after the application of the first two pricing policies that we proposed in Section 2.1. As a reference value, we adopt the fixed price P = 28 £ per PMSE user for 48 hours of access to the minimum requested bandwidth unit B R = 5 MHz [11] . We assume that this price will be offered to PMSE users with low QoS, therefore P L = 28 £. We further adopt the Ofcom's policy P (bB R ) = bP (B R ), which means that the price increases linearly with the bandwidth, corresponding to 56 £ for 10 MHz and 112 £ for 20 MHz. For a given bandwidth, we set the price P H for the PMSE users with high QoS to be be K ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 20} times higher than P L . Finally, we point out that the other technical parameters have only an indirect impact on the price, affecting the number of PMSE users that can be supported.
We group the results based on the carrier frequency and, for each frequency, we present a set of six figures. For each of the three propagation environments that we have studied, we present two figures: one for a BS transmit power of 20 dBm and another one for 30 dBm. Each figure consists of six plots, where we present the first and the second pricing policies for each of the three supporting bandwidth levels.
Figs. 5-7 presents a set of six figures for the carrier frequencies f =800, 2600, and 3800 MHz.
Before proceeding with specific comments, we will discuss a number of remarks that hold for all figures of the section. In each figure, the y-axis corresponds to the revenue and the x-axis depicts the value of parameter K. Moreover, the three horizontal line plots correspond to the For the two line plots of the same color in each figure, we are interested in comparing the no price discrimination with the second degree of price discrimination. Towards this direction, a useful notion is the market equilibrium which corresponds to a point where the MNO is indifferent between the two pricing policies, since both of them generate the same revenue. This is interpreted graphically as the intersection point of the two line plots. Due to the form of the two line plots (a constant and a linearly increasing function respectively), both the existence and the uniqueness of the market equilibrium are guaranteed [9] .
For the case of 800 MHz in Fig. 5 , we notice that the value of K that corresponds to the market equilibrium is quite large for free space and indoor environments. For example, it is always above 9 for B = 20 MHz, which means that all users with Q H should be willing to pay more than 1000£ at the market equilibrium. The value of K is even higher for 5 and 10 MHz.
Though we do not have available data to predict the purchasing power of the PMSE users, we estimate empirically from adjacent markets [10] that not all of them will be willing to pay this amount. Therefore, we expect that any market with price P L similar to the one suggested by
Ofcom will most probably operate in the region below the market equilibrium. This means that the revenue of the MNO will be higher for the case of no price discrimination, i.e. the MNO prefers to support the PMSE users with low QoS requirements. On the other hand, for the outdoor environment, the market equilibrium for all bandwidth levels can be admitted for a smaller value of K (typically between 3 and 5), meaning that the second degree of price discrimination is expected to yield a higher revenue for the MNO.
Figs. 6 and 7 present the same set of figures for 2600 and 3800 MHz. Since the revenue trends for these frequencies are very similar, we discuss them together. Comparing the trends with those for 800 MHz, we notice the following two differences. i) For 2600 and 3800 MHz, the revenue difference V 30 − V 20 is positive not only for B = 20 MHz, but also for 10 MHz.
This difference arises for indoor and outdoor environments. A general conclusion from Figs. 5, 6 and 7 is that the MNO should operate at 20 dBm whenever it offers a bandwidth of 5 MHz.
ii) With the exception of the outdoor scenario for 20 dBm, the market equilibrium arises for a large value of K (For 800 MHz, we recall that a market equilibrium for a small value of K arises for all outdoor scenarios). Therefore, we expect that, in all other cases, the market will operate at the region where the MNO's revenue is higher without price discrimination. 
Results for PMSE Users with Mixed QoS Requirements
In this section we extend the discussion of Section 3.1 presenting the results for the scenario with mixed QoS requirements, i.e. Scenario 3 in Table 2 . We first present the maximum number of supported PMSE users in Section 3. The dependence of the number of users on the propagation environment follows the same trend as for the users with the same QoS, i.e. for f =800 MHz the highest number of users for the mixed QoS scenario is also obtained for the indoor environment, whereas for f =2600
and 3800 MHz the highest number of users is obtained for free space. The number of users for the outdoor environment is in general the lowest, regardless of f . These trends are due to the different PL models applicable for different frequencies, consistent with our discussion in 
MNO's Revenue for No Price Discrimination vs. Second Degree Price Discrimination Updated with Mixed QoS Scenario
In this section, we update the comparison presented in Section 3.1.2 with the mixed QoS scenario. We recall that the MNO's revenue is computed by using (2). (f ) outdoor, f =2600 MHz Figure 9 : Revenue for Scenarios 1, 2, 3, for f =800 and 2600 MHz, for different propagation environments and BS transmit power levels T .
color in each figure, we notice that, for any value of the parameter K the mixed QoS scenario hardly ever generates the highest revenue. Therefore, the MNO is not encouraged to consider In this section, we compare the first three pricing policies that we defined in Section 2.1. As we have discussed, the third pricing policy assumes that the users that belong to the set N H −N H ,M will pay a discounted price s H P H , where we set s H = 0.5 in our simulations. However, when it comes to comparing the mixed QoS scenario with the low QoS scenario, the results do not change from Section 3.2.2. The MNO is expected to generate higher revenue by adopting the mixed QoS scenario only for the outdoor environment (for 20 and 30 dBm for 800 MHz, and, marginally, for 20 dBm for 2600 MHz). This means that in most scenarios, the no price discrimination policy remains the dominant pricing policy.
MNO's Revenue for Second Degree Price Discrimination vs. Third Degree
Price Discrimination with Discounts on Q H and Q L
In this section, we compare the second degree of price discrimination with the third degree of price discrimination, introducing the fourth policy that we have proposed. In this policy, we further assume that the users that belong to the set N L − N L,M will pay a discounted price
We set s L = 0.8 in our simulations, offering a smaller discount for the users with Q L than the users with Q H . We note that the trends in the simulation results that we will present in the next paragraph hold even by setting a higher value (close to 0.95) for s L . (with the exception of the scenarios {20 dBm, outdoor, 2600 MHz} and {20 dBm, indoor, 800
MHz}). Therefore, we conclude that for this case, where the no price discrimination policy cannot be adopted by definition, the choice between a second degree price discrimination for a mixed QoS scenario and a third degree price discrimination for either a high QoS or a low QoS scenario depends heavily on the three key technical parameters: carrier frequency, propagation environment and BS transmit power. 
Discussion & Conclusions
The goal of this study was to perform a techno-economic evaluation of the potential of sharing the MNO's radio spectrum and network infrastructure with PMSE users in an LSA framework.
For a given configuration of technical parameters, i.e. the carrier frequency, the BS transmit power level, the propagation environment and the bandwidth, the technical challenge is to estimate the maximum number of PMSE users that can be supported. Towards this direction, we developed a methodology to estimate this number, considering three scenarios, where all users have either only low QoS requirements or only high QoS requirements, as well as a mixed QoS scenario.
Based on QoS differentiation, we developed three QoS-aware pricing policies, corresponding to applications of second and third degree of price discrimination schemes. We also considered the additional baseline policy of no price discrimination, currently adopted by Ofcom, where all users pay the same price. For each scenario, we computed analytically the estimated revenue of the proposed pricing policies, providing conditions for the derivation of the policy that maximizes the MNO's revenue. From our theoretical model we then derived quantitative results based on our network and market simulations and current Ofcom prices.
Summary of Results
Our results revealed that the purchasing power of the users is the most decisive factor for determining the optimal pricing policy. In markets where all users with low QoS can afford to pay the face value, no price discrimination outperforms QoS-aware pricing policies, for almost all configurations of technical parameters. In such markets, our quantitative results highlighted that the MNO would have motivation to adopt a QoS-aware pricing scheme only if it could charge the users with high QoS an order of magnitude more than the users with low QoS.
Judging from the purchasing behaviour of the users in adjacent markets, we expect that the demand for high QoS services will be elastic. Therefore, we expect that when the price increases significantly, the revenue will drop significantly, since a significant portion of the users will not be able to afford to buy these services. On the other hand, in markets where a subset of users that belong to the low QoS class have tighter budget constraints, the adoption of a third degree of price discrimination for these users is necessary. In these cases, price discrimination is always the dominant pricing policy. Depending on the exact set of technical parameters, the MNO maximizes its revenue by either supporting users with high QoS (third degree of price discrimination), or mixed QoS scenarios (second degree of price discrimination).
Policy Takeaways & Future Research Directions
Our study has shown overall that the pricing policy matters when considering the incentives that a single MNO has to lease spectrum to PMSE users via LSA. An interesting future direction is thus including the extension of the techno-economic study to oligopoly markets where two or three MNOs are interested in leasing part of their spectrum to a number of PMSE users. The application of game theory [10] is a natural way to model the interactions among the competing MNOs. A critical question in such markets is whether there exists a set of equilibrium prices, where none of the MNOs has motivation to change unilaterally its pricing policy. In such markets, the MNO's pricing policy can be analysed using additional key performance indicators, such as the maximization of the market share and the maximization of the profit.
Furthermore, in our study we considered four families of pricing policies that an MNO could adopt in an LSA framework and our results suggest that the preferred policy is in general no price discrimination, but sometimes second or third degree of price discrimination are more beneficial. Another potential direction would thus be the adoption of other types of smart data pricing schemes, e.g. usage-based pricing or negotiated contracts [22] .
Finally, our results also showed that the MNO's preferred pricing policy strongly depends on the configuration of technical parameters, e.g. QoS class, BS transmit power, carrier frequency, available bandwidth, and propagation environment. For instance, for our considered configurations, the MNO would prefer to support PMSE users belonging to the low QoS class in most cases, but sometimes users from mixed high and low QoS classes are preferred. This suggests that further investigation on the interplay between technical and economic conditions should be conducted, in order to gain deeper insights and reach desirable spectrum policy outcomes (e.g. clearing bands and redeploying the service/technology in a different band via LSA). Also, from the perspective of the market designer, it is interesting to study the complementary problem of how to drive the market to socially desirable operational regions, e.g.
where users with multiple QoS classes can be supported. The challenge for the market regulator is to provide incentives to the MNO in order to align its own interest with the improvement of the social welfare. Table 3 .
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